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Text and Subject Position after Althusser
Abstract
Althusser's achievement is that he redefined Marxism. He reconceptualizes history and totality in terms of
different times, construes knowledge as the outcome of a process of construction, and interprets
subjectivity as an effect of ideology and unconscious processes. Unfortunately, Althusser's functionalist
view of ideology claims that the subject recognizes itself as a subject because it duplicates— reflects—an
absolute subject. However, Lacan's notion of the mirror stage remedies this fault. Lacan's subject always
misrecognizes itself in a process of contradiction that threatens the stability of any given social order.
Moreover, unlike Foucault's subject, which is limited in that subjectivity is folded back into a vaguely
expanded notion of "power," this revised Althusserian subject allows careful reading of texts. The critic
does not simply read against the grain; he or she exposes the multiple points of identification offered the
reader. For example, Wordsworth's "The Solitary Reaper" installs the reader in multiple positions: a
devotee of high culture and the national canon, a lover of the verbal signifier and its play, a consumer of
confessional discourse, and a masculine "I" desiring a laboring, singing woman.
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"a bare subject without a world never
`is' proximally, nor is it ever given."
Heidegger
After the British hostage, Terry Waite, came back to England from
five years in solitary confinement he spoke live on television and made
a very revealing verbal slip. Recounting his suffering in Beirut he told
how one day he was allowed a single postcard. This had a picture of John
Bunyan on the front. Then, said Waite, "turning over the car," he read
a message of encouragement on the back. What had brought his
unconscious thoughts so close to death? Was it the physical deprivation
only or was it rather the way a normal human identity had been denied
to him by the others around, who had treated him as though he hardly
existed at all?
Perhaps we might now see that a major weakness of classic
Marxism was its anthropology: its determination to define the human
in terms ofa single instinct, and that instinct as biological survival rather
than the desire for recognition. Arguably, then, it has been the achievement of Althusser's writing to turn Marxism away from questions of
production and survival towards the issues of reproduction and identity.
To read Althusser this way is to treat certain aspects of his project as
residual, particularly (1) a willingness to retain a privileging of economic practice via the notion that the social formation is ("ultimately")
a structure in dominance, and (2) the assumption associated with this
privileging, that a knowledge of the real is available to science and its
"theoretical practitioners" but not to the rest of us who are irredeemably sunk in ideology. It was no accident, as we used to say, that in the
United States the otherwise admirably comprehensive poststructuralist
reading lists went straight from Adorno to Barthes, missing Althusser,
and it is entirely to be welcomed that serious attempts are being
undertaken to make good that lack. Althusser earns the right to go on
being read (or to be read for the first time) in the 1990s because of three

conceptual interventions, each of which depends on the others.
(1) Althusser reconceptualizes history and totality in terms of
"different times," in fact of time as multidimensional, a swerving
bundle of uneven temporalities (Althusser and Balibar 94-100). I have
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found myself frequently citing and attempting to amplify this insight
(Easthope, British 16-19 and Literary 182-88), and am glad to note that
Robert Young in White Mythologies (1990) gives a warm endorsement
to Althusser's conception of a totality which "is never totalisable
because it is decentred and displaced in time" (White 58). (2) Since
Althusser rejects the Hegelian and (early) Marxist account oftotality as
an expressive unity and since that conception of an object presupposes
correspondingly a notion of Man as humanist subject, Althusser must
replace any form of epistemology that presumes the real to yield
knowledge of itself with one in which knowledge is emphatically the
outcome of production, a process of the construction of knowledge (to
say this is not to deny certain problems with his own epistemological
stance) (3). Since, again, Althusser is working with (and working
through) a rethinking of totality as decentered, it is not merely the
subject of knowledge who has to be thought of as situated in relation to
a specific form of discourse-it is subjectivity in general. I would
persist in claiming that Althusser's most important contribution, presaged in his earlier work but becoming explicit in the essay on ideology
of 1969, is to rethink subjectivity as an effect of both ideology and the
process of the unconscious.
From this basis in a concern with the subject, my paper will be
directed at several topics. It will first take the essay on ideology and try
to update some of our readings of that text. Then it will turn to review
the way the essay's implications were developed into a particular form
of analysis in what I would want to call "British post-structuralism,"
at this point offering a comment on the comparative limitations of what
you can do in the same mode by drawing on the work of Foucault. Third,
with a poem as illustration and with a more positive intention, I shall
enter an expansion and defence of the Althusserian notion ofthe subject
as afforded a position and point(s) of identification in and by the text.
All of this briefly, and for the purposes of discussion.

Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses
Althusser's essay argues that for an economy to survive it must not
merely produce but also reproduce itself. This entails the reproduction
of labour-power and so of a workforce submissive to the rules of the
established order. Effected by state apparatuses (institutions), submission is secured by ideology which operates to reproduce subjects, to turn
"concrete individuals" (newborn babies) into speaking subjects. It
does so by "interpellating" or hailing subjects, constructing us so that
we come to think of ourselves as free, conscious, choosing selves (thus,
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/9
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for example, when the alarm clock goes on Monday morning I say "I'm
getting up" rather than "Here is someone submitting to the workdiscipline"). We are constructed in a process of recognition/
misrecognition such that the single subject recognizes itself as a subject
because it duplicates-reflects-an Absolute Subject (as Samuel does
at I Samuel 3 when he replies to God's call with the words, "Here am
I"). The process of recognition/misrecognition "is speculary, i.e., a
mirror-structure" (Lenin 168).
In a critique of Althusser's theory that should be essential reading
for anyone concerned with the area, Paul Hirst proposes that this
account of ideology is not fully coherent, particularly over two issues:
it is functionalist in that it supposes the subject as fixed and given (Hirst
40-74). It is functionalist in the traditional sociological sense that an
explanation is functionalist if it understands a social feature as an effect
contributing to the overall stable functioning of society as a whole;
Althusser's theory of ideology is functionalist in that it envisages a
mode of production (capitalism) as reproducing itself in the form of
classes (ruling/working), which in turn are reproduced by the state
apparatuses as subjects (rulers/work-force) who are the effect of a
destination for that mode of production-a process of reproduction so
perfectly mediated it excludes any possibility of disturbance, contradiction and radical transformation. In doing so-in order to do soAlthusser's account conceives the subject as fixed and given. The
subject misrecognizes itself in an image reflected in the Absolute
Subject but, further, as Hirst points out:
[that image is] recognized by the subject as its image. Recognition,
the crucial moment of the constitution (activation) of the subject,
presupposes a point of cognition prior to the recognition. (65)
In other words, if I recognize my identity (even in a misrecognized
image), I am already there able to do the recognising: I am myself, an
absolute subject, one that is (metaphysically) pre-given. [In Making
Sense of Marx Jon Elster has developed a much larger critique of
functionalist tendencies in Marxism anticipated in Hirst's response to
Althusser.]
There is, of course, a quick remedy here, for both Althusser's
functionalism and the accompanying notion of a metaphysical subject.
It comes from Lacan's account of the mirror stage, which Althusser
avowedly leans on for the idea of misrecognition. In Lacan the subject
only ever misrecognizes its identity, there is no recognition and no
ensuing fixity, the subject is always caught between the stability of the
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I it thinks it is and the unconscious process of which this I is a provisional
and temporary effect (Ecrits 1-7). Reinserted into the social formation,
this notion of a fluid subjectivity once again oils the wheels of change,
perhaps even making them skid. That "an analysis of the place of the
unconscious is a vital element in ideological struggle" is the theme of
Coward and Ellis in Language and Materialism (1977), for the reason
stated with brisk confidence by Catherine Belsey with reference to the
Lacanian theory of ego: "It is this contradiction in the subjectbetween the conscious self, which is conscious in so far as it is able to
feature in discourse, and the self which is only partially represented
there-that constitutes the source of possible change" (85).
A concept of the "subject-in-process" does overcome the problem
of Althusser's functionalism, but at a cost which is well-known and too
frequently insisted upon by friends and enemies to require documentation. lithe subject is in process, if the I is only the effect of misrecognition,
if this is the source and motor for social transformation, what are we to
say about conscious choice and deliberate collective action, the traditional modes of radical and progressive politics? I do not expect to be
able to resolve the theoretical issue and its conjoint political dilemma
but, at the risk of a slight digression, I shall pursue a little the question
of recognition/misrecognition.

Recognition/Misrecognition
Freud, from the first, seeks to equate the ego with the perceptionconsciousness system (though increasingly through his work this
equation becomes qualified). The conscious I perceives and knows the
world of external reality; it recognizes it as though from outside, from
a supposedly exterior point of origin outside that which is simply given.
This account of the "bodily ego" has been developed notably by
Richard Wollheim and deployed by him to attack Lacanian theory as
represented by Juliet Mitchell by arguing that through an essentially
corporeal process the I develops as "thebody registers itself ' (Wollheim
"Psychoanalysis" 64; see also the reply by Zaretsky and Chodorow).
More recently, Malcolm Bowie in a book on Lacan has drawn attention
to the fact that Lacanian theory of the I--which treats the ego as
misrecognition and therefore exclusively as an unconscious processhas nothing to say about the I that recognizes external reality (18-19).
Consciousness, recognition, rational choice or the unconscious,
misrecognition, "it speaks"? Recourse to an unfashionable writer may
go some way to unsettle this binary opposition. Maurice MerleauPonty, Lacan's close friend, sets out in The Structure ofBehaviour of
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/9
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1942 to criticize the Cartesian opposition between categories of the
human and the animal, between mind and body, though in doing so he
is impelled to circumscribe areas in which human perception appears
to differ from that of the other animals (he has at his disposal plenty of
contemporary scientific evidence from human and animal psychology).
What Merleau-Ponty proposes is that other animals cannot perceive the
object in itself, that is, independent of its context. Spiders, for example,
can see a fly as a fly when it is struggling in a web but not ifone is simply
dropped into their nest. After citing an experiment in which chimpanzees were set the task of moving boxes Meleau-Ponty asserts:

What is lacking in the chimpanzee is the capacity of creating
relations between visual stimuli (and between the motor excitations which they elicit) which express and symbolize its most
familiar kinetic melodies. The animal cannot put itself in the place
of the moveable thing and see itself as the goal. It cannot vary the
points of view, just as it cannot recognize something in different
perspectives as the same thing.
What is really lacking in the
animal is the symbolic behavior which it would have to possess in
order to find an invariant in the external object. (118)
.

.

.

To recognize something "as the same thing," to find "an invariant in
the external object": while other animals and the human animal do
perceive and respond to external reality, only the speaking subject can
represent an object to itself as an entity, as having a fixed identity across
space and time. We can do so, Merleau-Ponty explains, because: (1) we
have an image of our bodies as "a concrete unity capable of entering
into a multiplicity of relations without losing itself ' (precisely the
image of the unified body that Lacan says the infant finds in its
reflection); (2) we have language and can line up the sign (signifier and
signified) with an object in external reality (118).
It looks as though Lacan's account of the I in the mirror stage has
been influenced by Merleau-Ponty. Since object and subject are always
produced together and reciprocally, the spatially discriminated and
temporally persisting world of entities perceived by the speaking
subject must correspond to and support the effect of "the mental
permanence of the I" (2). On this admittedly undeveloped showing, it
seems that even the I as a perception-consciousness system is more of
an unconsciously charged effect than conventional psychologies concede. While nothing in this argument cancels the reality of perception
and the fact that perception is perception of the real, it does tend to
strengthen the claims of the Lacanian account of the ego, certainly as
Published by New Prairie Press
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these might be denied by appeal to either Freud or conventional
psychology. External objects really are perceived by speaking subjects,
but those objects (and the very capacity to perceive them as entities) are,
as it were, one side in the surface which has on its other side an
unconscious lining, so that objects in the real count at the same time as
objects of desire. It is consistent with this position that Lacan should
define the subject's ego as "that which is reflected of his [sic] form in
his objects" (194). The world that I see around me (which as a neonate
I could not see because the ego had not yet developed) is caught up in
a phantasy by which my identity is reflected back to me and as me.

Interpellation and Subject Position
Althusser's essay on ideology reached England in the early 1970s
and was developed especially in the work of the film journal, Screen,
as a means of analysing the way aesthetic texts afford a position to the
reader as an effect of discourse. Althusser, however, was rethought with
Hirst's criticisms already built in; a theory was worked through in which
the ideological operation of a text was assessed in terms of how it sought
to interpellate or position its reader even while that operation itself was
conceived on the basis of a Lacanian account of misrecognition. In a
story I've tried to tell elsewhere (British 1-122), the project of integrating (Althusserian) Marxism with (Lacanian) psychoanalysis on the
grounds of a (Saussurian) analysis of specific signifying practices
ramified in Britain during the 1970s and early 1980s from film theory
into cultural studies, branches of the social sciences, the study of
history, social psychology, art history, even musicology, and finally of
course literary theory. In doing so the concept of the positioning of the
subject as an effect of discourse became qualified and complexified.
What one might call the classic Screen view was at its strongest
when facing off a polarized opposition between realism and modernism. Thus, in realist modes of representation the attempt by various
strategies to efface the signifier offered the reader a position which was
produced but whose production was denied, a position as a would-be
autonomous or transcendental subject therefore; in modernist modes in
which the signifier was foregrounded, the reader was denied any such
comfortable superiority and compelled to experience the process of his
or her own construction. Further, it was argued that Hollywood constituted a visual regime in which the would-be transcendental position
should be characterized as typically masculine, so that modernist and
avant-garde texts could be thought of as opening possibilities to the
feminine gaze. [It goes without saying that at stake is an implied
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/9
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sponse by an empirical reader.] Three important reconsiderations ofthe
notion of subject positioning need to be mentioned.
(1) In an article on "The Avant-garde and its Imaginary" first
published in 1977, Constance Penley criticized the possibility that the
avant-garde text disrupted its spectator's apparent self-sufficiency (328). She argued first, that the subject as an I always had to find a place
in what Lacan terms the Imaginary order (the alternative being psychosis), and second, that the fragmentation of the avant-garde text was
always matched by the spectator's epistemophilia, that is, by he or she
knowing it was such a text and so mastering its proffered self-divisions.
On this showing, other factors are at work in the positioning of the
subject than anything like a unitary relation between text and subjectclearly the subject was already constrained prior to its encounter with
the text (knowing it was a work of the avant-garde, for instance). (2) In
an article of 1984 Liz Cowie draws on Freud's essay "A Child is Being
Beaten" and its development by J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis in their
essay, "Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality," to propose that far from
a film's viewer being given a single position, the text in fact offered
everyone multiple points of identification. Just as the subject might find
a place in the fantasy scenario of "a child is being beaten" by imagining
a rival is being beaten, or they themselves, or they are watching the
beating, so a film spectator's identifications might be split simultaneously between characters, between different aspects of a situation, or
for that matter different objects and effects on the screen. Again the
notion of a singular subject position is challenged. (3) In their authoritative study, Film Theory: An Introduction (1988), Rob Lapsley and
Michael Westlake review the Screen endeavour to define realism in
terms of the position of dominant specularity, as it were, outside and
looking on, and find compelling reasons for challenging the belief that
there is anything like a single exchange between text and reader. Instead
they offer the view "that the spectator judging the text to be realistic
identifies with one who knows the truth," that the spectators identify
not simply with a position offered by the text but are predisposed by
a number of discursive effects (including the location of truth in a
particular society) to adopt an image of themselves that is locally
supported by the text (178). There are clearly problems here that I shall
try to unpack a little with an example.
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Positions and Identifications: "The Solitary Reaper"
Classic structuralism was superseded, quite rightly, because it
hoped for the impossible, to freeze the text in an atemporal, synchronic
moment. Poststructuralism, in contrast, by stressing the variability of
the text-that it is always read differently across time-begins to make
it impossible to say anything about textuality that could not, in
principle, be as rapidly annulled. Notions of the positioning of the
subject by the text go some way to resolve this dilemma for they
recognize both the effectivity of the text on one side and the potential
infinity of reader response on the other. The concept of "the dialectic
of the subject" is anticipated in Lacan's account of how the linear
unfolding of the signifying chain is always caught in and by the subject's
prospective and retroactive interpretation of that chain (it is for this
reason Lacan affirms there is "an incessant sliding of the signified
under the signifier," 154). In this exchange the subject is constituted by
the object to the extent that he or she is transformed by it so that "the
subject is at once the producer and product of the meaning" (Lapsley
and Westlake 53).
This account ensues from the Althusserian intervention, and I find
it hard to see by what other means such a persuasive and forceful kind
of analysis might have been achieved. Despite his retrospective claim
that it was "not power, but the subject" that was the general theme of
his research, Foucault's project consistently suffers from his determination to fold back subjectivity into a vaguely expanded notion of
"power" (Foucault 209). Although his studies-of punishment and
discipline, of the history of sexuality-present a detailed historical
account of discursive and social practices, they fail to explain how and
why the subjectivity should ever desire to become instituted
(interpellated) into these practices. In defying the notion of the unconscious, in fact seeking to redescribe it-from an essentially sociological
point of view-as a mode of "power," Foucault's work in fact becomes
reductive to the extent that it ignores the challenge of this other. Aware
of the dangers of functionalism, not least because of Althusser's
ideology essay (as the 1982 Afterword acknowledges), Foucault struggles
to inject into his account of power some recognition of the radical
possibilities that Althusser's essay so obviously demands, and (as my
own history here recalls) very soon receives, certainly in the work of
British poststructuralists. Power enables and disables, it provokes and
expresses resistance while also containing it: this overtly psychoanalytic conception of structuration and effectivity (power now sounds like
nothing so much as Freud's version of sexuality) is forced into a social
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/9
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and ideological matrix where it does not fit. Subsequent accounts, such
as that offered as New Historicism, fail to resolve these difficulties, and
only demonstrate more clearly how unsatisfactory it is to try to make
a Foucauldian social analysis apply to texts.
Resistance, enabling/disabling, expression/repression-this movement is surely much better theorized on the model of interpellation in
terms of the way the text offers positions for its reading which, according to the dialectic of the subject, are always both accepted and
exceeded in specifically analyzable way. As for instance in the case of
the following poem, first published in 1807 in Wordsworth's Poems in
Two Volumes:

The Solitary Reaper
Behold her, single in the field,
Yon solitary Highland Lass!
Reaping and singing by herself;
Stop here, or gently pass!
Alone she cuts and binds the grain,
And sings a melancholy strain;
0 listen! for the Vale profound
Is overflowing with the sound.
No Nightingale did ever chaunt
More welcome notes to weary bands
Of travellers in some shady haunt,
Among the Arabian sands:
A voice so thrilling ne'er was heard
In spring-time from the Cuckoo-bird,
Breaking the silence of the seas
Among the farthest Hebrides.
Will no one tell me what she sings? Perhaps the plaintive numbers flow
For old, unhappy, far-off things,
And battles long ago:
Or is it some more humble lay,
Familiar matter of today?
Some natural sorrow, loss, or pain,
That has been, and may be again?
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Whate'er the theme, the Maiden sang
As if her song could have no ending;
I saw her singing at her work,
And o'er her sickle bending:I listened, motionless and still;
and, as I mounted up the hill,

The music in my heart I bore,
Long after it was heard no more.
Long before the individual identity of the poem comes into view at all
the text functions as a point representing a number of imbricated
intertextual categories, each of which hails the contemporary reader
into a certain identification for which the single text is one supporting
instance. A schematic outline of these might indicate:
1. Fiction/Art. Present-day Western society operates with a broad
opposition across the discursive formation between "documentary"
and what might be called "fictional-artistic" discourses. Each acts to
exclude properties and effects from the other as do the other Great
Oppositions (production/consumption, work/leisure, place of work/
home, duty/pleasure, city/country). While documentary discourse advances itself as legitimate, official, factual and objective, fictionalartististic discourse must occur as its other-subjective, potentially
transgressive, the bearer of values, even indeed the meaning of life.
Since the opposition masculine/feminine pervades the discursive formation all this tends to install the reader approaching a poem such as
"The Solitary Reaper" in a feminine position.

2. High Culture/Popular Culture. As part of high culture and the national

canon of English literature, the poem promises the subject a flattering
self-identification as a reader of high culture, that is, I would argue,
structured according to a certain economy between the ego ideal, the
ego and desire, one which differs from that afforded intertextually by
popular culture. The high cultural reader is positioned in a relation to
the superego which, paradoxically, constitutes a rationalization for
possible forms of transgression inhibited in popular culture.
3. Literature/Poetry. John Ellis points out that the cinenfagoer is
captured by "an identification with the cinematic apparatus itself '
(41), just as the spectator at the cinema-or participant in taught
courses on film-reveals a predisposition for "visual pleasure" so that
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/9
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all such audiences share desire in the form of scopophilia (to use the
more elaborate term by which Freud's English translator renders the
simpler German Schaulust). Similarly, between the different artistic
media-graphic art, music, dancing-the Wordsworth poem inscribes
its reader as one who finds pleasure in the play of the verbal signifier
(this poem is written in lines that are patterned solely on the basis of
phonetic repetition, mainly iambic tetrameter, with another purely
phonetic scheme recurring in the four stanzas of eight lines rhyming
ababccdd).
4. Genre. The lyric has a specific place within poetry, although it

overlaps in certain respects with modes for "personal expression" in
other arts and certainly invites the reader into an identification with
"the individual voice" not at all so easily available in other narrative
and epic genres. It would be useful and valid at this point to call on
Foucault's account of confessional discourse, for this is in fact an
instance of discourse in which a represented I "confesses" an inward
delectation and "movement of the soul" to an unnamed interlocutor (a
movement which is erotized moreover). But from this generalized
theme and into the particularity of the text Foucault's account could not
take us-it would not for example consider how, in a historical
innovation_, the lyric genre becomes subsumed into a grouping of texts
by author, so that the reader submits to what might be called "the desire
for Wordsworth" (identity therefore as a sensitive, high-minded belle
ame whose profound self-concern is masked as a deeply significant love
of Nature).

Textual Operation (the signifier). Only now does the particular
identity of the text begin to emerge and be at issue. "The Solitary
Reaper" is certainly a poem, that is, a certain organisation of the
signifier, but it conforms to a specific kind of signifying practice
(Romantic poetry in the English post-Renaissance tradition) that
attempts to efface the signifier by promoting the signified, an individual
voice represented as "really" speaking. Thus the use of the present
tense and demonstratives in the first two stanzas (the reader is ordered
with a present imperative to "Behold her," to "Listen," to see "Yon
solitary Highland Lass") implies a situated first-person speaker who is
nominated in the third stanza ("Will no one tell me what she sings?")
and finds explicit first-person expression in the repeated "I's" of the
fourth verse. Together with these effects, the sustained theme and
syntax imitate a personalized stream of consciousness that plausibly
manages a transition from present to past tense as-within the reprePublished by New Prairie Press
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sented course of the text-the speaker walks past the labouring woman
and out of sight of her "up the hill." Insofar as the text tends to become
a script for a voice observing and reflecting in the present, the reader
is compelled to overlook the traces of the signifier that makes this
possible and pass transparently into identification with the "I" of the
poem, a version of "Wordsworth" (see above).
6. Within the Text. According to the familiar patriarchal binary in which
"Man is Culture, Woman is Nature" and in which the mastering I of

the look belongs to a man while typically the object investigated by that
gaze is a woman, the I of this text is undoubtedly masculinized. In the
text there are multiple points of identification, not only with the
represented speaker and the woman he sees (and hears) but also with the
song as he tries to capture it, with other human figures (the "travellers"
in the desert, the implied agents of "battle" and "sorrow"), with
animate but non-human figures (the nightingale and the cuckoo), and
with inanimate objects represented such as the "vale," the "sands,"
the "Hebrides," the "hill," even the "grain" the woman cuts (presumably with a sharpened sickle). There is also a seductive identification
with the woman's mysteriously untranslatable song. To be sure,
discrepancies and disjunction open up between these points of identification. Since the speaker does not know what she sings, surely he has
to become her in order to imagine (in verse two) what she sings? How
does the desert cohere with the Hebrides? Yet what is perhaps remarkable rather is how far the text is able to make so much hold together
within a unified scenario in which a man, confronted by his other in the
form of a bending woman concerned only with herself and singing in
an unknown tongue, is able to transform her into a knowable object of
desire he can incorporate into his own experience.
Just as all the objects represented in the poem seem able to reflect
back an appropriately consistent image of the speaker's subjectivity, so
the text itself offers to secure a confirming identity for its reader.
Referring back to points one to four, we might suppose that the woman's
song as he envisions it aims to transcend and reconcile the differences
between him and her but also (since the poem itself is a lyric) that
between reader and text and (since poetry is a species of song) between
text and genre, and further between genre, medium, high culture and art.
Of course there are any number of strategies by which one could begin
to undo this apparent unity and closure: by picking up the poem's
representation of "song" and "work" and taking that back to the
opposition between documentary and fictional-aesthetic discourse; by
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol18/iss1/9
interrogating its dependence on notions of masculine activity and
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feminine passivity when it is the woman's work coupled with her
aesthetic production placed as the other that is the condition for his
mastering and expressive experience put at the centre of the poem; by
recalling that signified depends upon signifier and pointing out, perhaps
irrelevantly but disturbingly nevertheless, that "Hebrides" is a written
signifier that mingles "He" with "brides."
It does not matter a great deal how the proffered identifications are
set at a distance. The main point is rather what makes such a reading
against the grain both legitimate and necessary. In the problematic
developed from the Althusserian account ofinterpellation, as appropriately corrected and reformulated in terms of the dialectic of the subject,
all my troublesome circumlocutions have a strategic and political
context-the text offers or provides or affords or seeks to secure a
position for its reader, it invites or encourages or promotes this or that
kind of identification. All these arise from a theoretical assumption
inscribed through this framework of analysis: the text, now, in the
present instance is trying to do something to us and always failing. The
problematic obliges us to attend both to specific questions about how
the text works and put its effectivity in question. It is in this respect
always transformatory.
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